There’s a lot here, so I have a lot of questions:
Would this be in the form of operational actions taken by GH, or would GH provide services that would seek to increase individual voter participation?
Currently only DPI is unlocked for metagovernance and DeFi is heavily referenced here; is this for DeFi protocols and app upgrades specifically? I’m curious where, say, ENS would fall in this scheme?
How does GH propose that it be held accountable for execution of metagov voting (failure to execute)?
If there is an IIP specific to GH, GH can vote? Reading the negative here, but I’d prefer to see this say, “GH will abstain from all IIP voting”. I fail to see why a MaaS subDAO (effectively the MGC v2) would get involved otherwise.
Related to the above concern, would there be visibility into who is voting in the 1of2 delegate multisigs?
On its face I don’t see how this objective will be achieved through the spec outlined. I do see how this will improve active INDEX participation and perhaps participation more broadly, but this would be a coordination function for proposals and execution of same, not a wallet-address growth function. If you can expand here I’d appreciate it.
Expanding on all of these bullets will be critical as this will form your operational spec, then it’s a matter of sorting IC<>GH communication standards, decision flow , value flow, and accountability (and you’re off to the races).
There are two things that GH is providing and it’s helpful to discuss separately:
- Vanilla metagovernance vote execution that is currently run through snapshot voting
- White-glove proposal service (still subject to the above)
To be clear fee generation can only come from the white-glove service as vote-execution needs to happen on behalf of Index Coop no matter what - so you can never charge for this. These processes would sit next to each-other for convenience but I’d prefer to keep these streams as independent as possible given that one is more akin to consulting and the other is ops living under one roof. The real value here is that they live under one roof, but absent automated (failing that, credibly neutral) operational process execution this subDAO would be of no practical use to IC.
I’ll have more comments and try and chip away at this monster proposal in the coming days; feel free to hit the comments ad-hoc as you’re refining this. Great initiative and I hope something comes of this; as always, just want to make sure everything is bolted down tight as IC wields an unholy amount of voting power that we’d be entrusting to this subDAO.