Enable Full-Time Contributors to Vote with Vesting Tokens

Yes! Thanks for clarifying.

1 Like

We are already seeing this

I’m with you @afromac in the sense that I trust the contributors subject to this proposal to generally vote in alignment with organizational sustainability; they are trusted by the community, and this incrementally would move us toward a more contributor-governed org. I’ll ask some questions here, however, that may help highlight the points I made above:

  • Why just these 5 contributors when there are others that have long-term standing, demonstrated commitment, and context? The first example that comes to mind is @overanalyser. Why stop short of engaging more contributors in the process, thus reducing the potential for misalignment with the broader community?
  • Why not set up a delegation process for the community treasury if the desire is to have informed and provably-committed Owls more active and powerful in governance? Why not let the contributors in question do a simple majority vote among themselves and then use all vested INDEX as a voting block?
  • Do the Owls in question actively participate in governance now and to what extent? Is there a demonstrable likelihood of this increasing community participation in governance?
  • Why not directly incentivize contributor participation in governance?
  • How would you and the subject Owls respond to the assertion that they are being granted voting power that rightfully resides in the community treasury, and not their wallet?

I feel that salaried contributors via this proposal are demonstrating a cavalier stance toward governance power and signaling little motivation for distributing that power to the broader and largely speculative contributor community. These are governance tokens, the very means we use to organize toward productive ends, and we’re very much putting the cart way out ahead of the horse if we start moving that power around without people having earned it yet. Just because I trust a person doesn’t mean I want to set up an entire process that relies on trust. Those fortunate enough to pull a salary here have earned the right to 15,000 votes over the specified timeframe and accelerating that sets a dangerous precedent.

That said, I’m about 2 hours into drafting thoughtful responses here, not getting compensated for it, while those that would benefit are, and are attempting to gain as-of-yet unearned voting power on top of what they have . . . this goes against the core tenet of rewarding based on impact and creates two voting classes. There are way better solutions to the challenge presented - I’m asking that they be explored, as this is just one option and in my opinion one that is somewhat tone-deaf to the broader contributor community’s desire to have more say in our collective fate.


Had a quick chat with Noah earlier hoping to find a simple compromise that could be baked into the contracts, but it doesn’t exist without completely rewriting the IndexPowah contract which isn’t worthwhile just for this.

The next best step seemed to me to be a 6 month cliff unlock so I agree with your suggestion here David, and hope that represents a good middle ground.

To be honest given the noise made about autonomy it’s baffling to me there is so much pushback against this idea. It implies that a malicious actor who buys on the market is fine, but someone who has worked into a FT position might somehow represent a danger to the governance process. As AG pointed out there is a direct clawback in the vesting contracts which means any deliberately malicious actions would stand to lose any contributor a great deal from day 1.


I think this is a step towards that. This is progressive decentralization in action, in my eyes. It doesn’t end with these contributors; it starts with them.

To the rest of your questions, @mel.eth , I would respond that you are making the point - quite well - that the social norms around this kind of action are unclear at best. We are trying to achieve decentralization, with the best of intentions, but people have concerns about the seemingly ad hoc nature of the agreement and the implications for other people in the Coop.

The idea that I keep coming to, is that if we are going to be some kind of a democracy, we are going to need some kind of a constitution. It won’t be perfect, but it should go some way towards creating a framework that we can have these discussions within.


Thanks @afromac; reading your response, your voice in my head, has got me thinking about this a bit more constructively, so thank you.

I’d like to leave it at this: I hate defending an idea I hold on philosophical grounds that is at odds with a strongly desired outcome. I’d like to see this proposal presented as part of a larger initiative that:

  • Includes analysis of relative voting strength broken down by Owl, Stakeholders, Set, and DFP;
  • Brings together the various aspects of governance needed to meaningfully shift governance power to the contributor community;
  • Puts a linear or cascading unlock of voting power in place for vested tokens of FT Owls;
  • Involves general disclosures where appropriate, and specific ones should they arise for a given vote, as this will hopefully remain regarded as a privilege requiring trust from the contributor community; and,
  • Involves a statement from the Owls in question regarding their commitment to use the vested tokens to vote in-line with IC sustainability, along with stated consequences should those commitments be broken.

Essentially, this seems to be part of a larger plan, so I’d like to know that plan in more detail; and if it makes sense then, you’ll have my support. Implementing the part that potentially benefits those in a position to best drive meaningful change first, however, doesn’t give me sufficient confidence that the remainder of the plan will be a priority.

Dear FT Owls: I implore you to give some serious thought to the plight of the dozens of Owls that work day in and out here with no promise compensation, just the hope that some of you will find the work we do valuable and reward it. I have no doubt we’re all acting with empathy, but please be aware that defending a proposal for an instant 5-figure-INDEX governance unlock on the grounds of expediency and autonomy while essentially saying ‘just trust us’ when most Owls don’t crack the 3-figure-INDEX mark in a given month is likely to spur some strong reactions. If you want everyone that contributes meaningfully here to have a voice, it needs to be reflected in our governance process, and as it stands my already small governance voice within this community will be decimated if the proposal you are putting forth is put through without some meaningful increase in the governance power of the remaining contributor community. None of us would be here without you, but if you want to inspire continued buy-in, the deck shouldn’t feel quite so stacked. Thanks for reading this and I’m happy to chat more offline about any of this.


For me, I look at this with a real simple logic. Do we pay forward governance voting power for services not yet rendered based on trust or do we not.

If we do it for one type of contributor, then we shall treat all contributors equal. We do not want to encourage a tier ranking within the community.

Full Timers doing the same number of hours as a gold owl, arguably gets remunerated many multiple’s more. This was overwhelming clear when one full time hours gold owl transitioned to a full time contract. No material change in output, impact or hours of service and arguably no change in level of commitment either. But overnight, there was a material change in rewards. This is a design feature in the current structure.

Whilst there is two remuneration systems in place. I don’t not support adding benefits to a subset within the coop. We are a community of equals. I don’t agree with the renumeration divide. I do not agree with a governance benefits divide.

On the topic of Community ownership, this will only change if we review the genesis contract allocation. Only then will “Community Ownership” be of a comparable magnitude to other stakeholders. 0.15% x 100 = 1.5% This is tiny in the context of value add. Set Labs receives 28% which is oversized for the relative value add of the 60+ contributors in the community. Contributor ownership can only grow to be relevant with a genesis contract redistribution from Set Labs to Community.

Full Time benefits relative to Owls are growing further apart with proposals like this one.


A big fan of disclosures and hope more Owls choose to do them, especially if they are in a leadership or decision-making position. They should be more common in crypto and a great place for our DAO to take the lead.


I am against this proposal. @Matthew_Graham and @mel.eth have perfectly echoed my own thoughts in the comments below.

This comment from @fallow8 when the Autonomy Group was being formed feels highly relevant here as well.


So while we shoot ourselves down here, another 100k in voting power goes to outside parties / DFP / Matthew Graham.

Seems like this is an easy FOR. More community governance power unlocks to come, but this should be a standard.


Are you saying that FT contributors are part of the “community” and that Set, DFP, other methodologists, non-FT contributors, and (strangely) Matthew Graham are not?

All of these entities and individuals are integral components of the Index Cooperative community and I think that should be reflected in this discussion.

In this proposal, FT contributors are asking for special governance rights exclusive to themselves that do not apply to other community members.

How does giving FT contributors special and exclusive governance privileges benefit INDEX tokenholders?


I think this is a bit of an unfair assessment. We already allow our investors to vote with their full vesting token amounts. This proposal asks that we do the same thing but for the full-time contributors. Both our investors and the full-time group have money on the line and skin in the game. Why should we be treated any differently than the investors?

We have established a precedent that vesting tokens (outside of the Set Labs and treasury vesting) are allowed to vote. There is no special treatment going on here. If the community at large ends up receiving some form of vesting package, I would propose they receive those votes as well. Again, we are not asking to receive any extra votes, just those that have been allocated to us in our vesting packages.


No intention to be unfair. Maybe this is a lack of knowledge on my part. My understanding is that investors purchased their INDEX tokens subject to a lockup?

If my understanding is correct, then I don’t think you can make that direct comparison between investors and FT contributors. FT contributor vesting and investor lockups are not equivalent. The investors have already put up all their required capital for their locked INDEX tokens; the FT contributors have not done their full 2 years of work yet.


A gentle reminder of our Guiding Principles.

Matthew Graham has done a great job facilitating FEI DAO’s INDEX acquisition and the statement from FEI DAO has stated that while they are delegating to him (should the deal pass), their votes will go how the TRIBE holders vote.


Want to give more air to this. Thoughts from @mel.eth and @oneski22? It’s a blunt and unsatisfying instrument, but if that’s what you have at hand…

To me, linear vest is ideal, but I’m ok with that being roadmapped given other priorities.


totally fine with a 3 or 6-month cliff for simplicity, especially given that all eligible folks are long-standing members of our community who we all have deep faith in

I would hope that for future packages a cliff + vest structure is implemented especially if we do (and should) hire outside of the community.

1 Like

I actually see it as a net Owl contributor voice gain. Your factual dilution is offset by more governance in the hands of people who have to collaborate openly and are accessible on a weekly basis. We have direct access to these individuals.

I know you’re hung up on an ideologically shaky band-aid being applied to a gaping genesis wound. I feel that pain, too. I just think it helps while we’re waiting for surgery.


The Fei community does a snapshot vote just like Index Coop does for metaverse votes and I simply implement the communities vote just like how Dylan, Greg and Punia do for Index Coop.


Hi @fallow8,

There is an undoubtable renumeration bias towards Full Time contributors relative to the commitments of Gold, Silver and Bronze Owls. Full Timers doing the same number of hours as a gold owl, arguably gets remunerated many multiple’s more. This was overwhelming clear when one full time hours gold owl transitioned to a full time contract. No material change in output, impact or hours of service and arguably no change in level of commitment either. But overnight, there was a material change in rewards. This is a design feature in the current structure.

In isolation each progression seems small. However, both level of renumeration and now level of governance influence are bias towards the same subset within the community.

Why should we further elect to opt into a system that further extends the bias towards a select few ?

Would it not be more equitable to offer such terms to a different level of contributor/s first rather than stack benefits on the same group.

The approach outlined in this proposal is contentions at best and to me in principle feels unfair.


Inarguably, yes. I’ll readily admit that accelerated vesting of governance is pragmatic versus ideologically perfect. But it’s also relatively elegant. Those vesting contracts are just sitting there. They’re not going anywhere else unless one of the full-timers murders someone in the Coop.

To me, this isn’t about compensation for full-timers versus precious metal Owls. I’ll agree with you that that split isn’t necessarily fair, but it doesn’t change how I look at this. Our votes are determined by a select few as it stands. If you can appeal to certain figures and OTC sale investors, you can likely outvote the majority of the contributor community. This is a step away from that. To me it’s as simple as that.

To be clear I’m also only on board with a minimum 6-month cliff. So for each contributor that’s just an 18-month period where there’s differential (and that differential fades over that period). Imperfect? Yes. Better than the status quo? In my opinion, also yes.