Governance House

This is a little akin to a government voting in its own election on the basis of representative power. GH should specifically ABSTAIN from voting in regards to Governance House, if the intention here is to operate as a SubDAO subject to the will of INDEX token hodlers

And GH retains the voting power of all holders that do not vote,correct?

Do you have a threshold for large already in mind?
Why is this set up different for large index holders/delegates?
What is the purpose (advantage) of differentiating between delegates?
Or to ask the question a different way.
Why is the set up different for delegates not considered large.?

Can you explain the purpose (advantages) of an Externally Operated Account ?
Sans smart contracts right?
How is the decision to select the EOA undertake?

Sounds great! but tbh something (everything?) about this feel s like M&A territory

So basically the small group of well connected, active and trusted individuals seek to accrue immense power first, and then get paid to wield it? Just wondering if anyone else is questioning the motivations for this proposal at about this point…

Great upside, tangential to the Index Coop mission. Having clarified the benefits can you please discuss the limitations and risks associated with this proposal?

Can you clarify how delegate voting moves towards “the goal of trying to solve the voter apathy problem across defi.” Doesn’t delegation somewhat rely on voter apathy or at least ambivalence?

This is certainly innovative, I’m just not seeing how this helps us focus on achieving our mission. Keen to see how the conversation evolves

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