gm @anthonyb.eth and Owls -
I like this proposal in spirit given it moves toward better organization; I believe it confuses the challenges of decentralization and automation within The Cooperative.
As I see it, the Delegate Safe having the ability to reconstitute the three core pods means that there should not be an overlap of signers with the pods. At first blush I don’t know who the two non-individual signers are and given this appears to be a tacitly elected body in control of all DAO assets on behalf of token-holders, should there not be an election where those reputations can be examined by the electing INDEX holders? Put simply, this is a republic-model given it’s not on-chain, and this proposal outlines a structural (process and security) and leadership change (election) in one swoop . . . I’d like more context on the high-level signers and their track-record on dutifully and expeditiously representing the will of the INDEX tokenholders (as well as regional and intradisciplinary coverage by signers - three appear to be ‘product’ contributors).
Other concerns:
- The signing structure is 3-member/2-pods for each multisig . . . would it not be prudent to make the other pods requisite-signers on treasury expenditures? As it stands it appears the three individual treasury signers could drain the treasury without the other pods being able to prevent it.
- What is the cadence of re-election of signers at the three core pods and Delegate Safe? What entity is responsible for ensuring the legitimacy and accountaiblity of the INDEX token-voting process? Who is eligible to be a signer on the Delegate Safe?
- I can’t fully grok the system that’s being deprecated so even a vote for no change is still confusing. Who are the current signers on the relevant multisigs and where will assets be migrated from/to? Has a risk analysis been performed on the exact adding and deprecation of signers and xfer of assets or will that follow and be published? Have you retained a firm other than metropolis to review and have metropolis successfully transitioned a DAO in this way before? I’m thirsty for details that give me confidence it all stays bolted together through the transition described above.
I believe the proposal gives sufficient consideration to DAO internal organization and not enough to security and assurances on behalf of the INDEX tokenholder. My recommendation would be to agree on a revamped structure here and THEN hold an election for the 5 signers on the master contract as that is the only connection (defense) between the will of the INDEX tokenholders and DAO execution, and as proposed it’s still off-chain and appears fully capturable by a small DAO constituency of just 3 people.
Further, some discussion of the relevant utility of the INDEX token in light of these changes would be helpful context. The above IIP seems to change the governable surface of the Cooperative without making it more explicit or secure; what types of decisions will INDEX holders be making besides elections, and how often, or is this a move toward an elected board (shareholder model)? On one hand I like that the DAO are communicating desired structure; it speaks well to organizational coherence . . . on the other I think you’re missing the other half of the conversation and that’s that your collective is not governed by multisigs and humans, it’s governed by token voting and despite years now to sort it out, I’m still relying on humans to do the job of code . . . why can you still tell me no after I vote? (no one likes the word veto, but what you’ve retained in this model is DAO veto ability without addressing it properly - will the signers at least attest to some principle-based behaviors?) I want you all gone from that Delegate Safe and code in your place . . . it’s not meant to be personal and having held a position of power within a DAO I know you likely don’t enjoy that responsibility either as I try and empathize with those that crafted this proposal and are affected by it; is it possible and what steps are taking place at present to get IC gov on-chain given that this proposal doesn’t appear to move that needle?
I realize I may be lacking sufficient context and look forward to any corrections of fact above; on balance I’m quite impressed with this DAO, all contributors, and the recent transitions toward further practical autonomy. I’m abstaining from the current vote as I do see the above as net positive, but I find it lacking in the current form for the reasons above and do hope to see these concerns addressed in the near future regardless of proposal passage. Thanks Owls!