This proposal has been posted in several Discord channels, including Treasury, Org and Governance Work.
It seems to me like it might make sense to shift & centralise the conversation here.
Here’s the proposal
Let’s discuss.
3 Likes
I feel like a similar structure in the Coop could provide for more internal flexibility, and possibly speed up some action.
What are some downsides to this? Things would certainly get a bit more complicated in some regard.
1 Like
Yeah, that will take some time to digest. The examples made me lol but wow, gonna sleep on it. And would love to hear everyone’s take. Obviously, they need to end their temporary situation but it does seem quite complicated.
2 Likes
I think everyone should read the Yearn proposal.
Some initial thoughts from me. Yearn is, obviously, much more complicated than the Coop. But there are a lot of similarities in the structure + some things we can learn/consider implementing.
This strikes a chord with me. This is the way I see the Coop. We are not there yet but we are on our way.
"Yearn is a network of independent doers united by a shared vision. Our bias is on action over bureaucracy. We move fast with great freedom and agency. This is our way."
Here’s the TLDR of Yearn’s proposal: delegate power & decision making to autonomous groups, centralise execution of decisions with the MultiSig, give YFI holders ultimate oversight in case things go wrong.
This is how I see Yearn’s proposed model comparing to the Coop model. I’m generalising here.
Working groups are roughly = yTeams
Treasury Committee roughly = Yearn MultiSig
The main difference is the distribution of decision making authority and role of INDEX vs. YFI tokenholders.
yTeams have the power to make decisions for their respective areas without seeking approval from YFI holders. The execution of their decisions sits with Yearn MultiSig and the MultiSig has veto power. YFI holders have oversight power. They can strip decision making powers from different yTeams, grant new powers to other yTeams and remove people from the MultiSig, among a few other responsibilities.
At the Coop, working groups have to request funding from the Treasury Committee and INDEX holders need to vote on each budget and formation of each WG. Each WG can then execute their own decisions. There’s no oversight or veto power. Once approved and funded, WGs can do whatever they want.
Adapting Yearn’s model to Index would look something like this → Treasury Committee as a MultiSig → WGs as yTeams → TWG has the power to budget and fund WGs → Each WG has the power to make their decisions, executed by the MultiSig which also has veto power → INDEX tokenholders have ultimate oversight.
If anyone is interested I can come up with some examples, similar to those in the Yearn proposal, for how this might work.
Do I think we are ready for this level of autonomy? Probably not. But I look forward to other people’s thoughts on this.
6 Likes
Interesting proposal with hilarious examples.
Governance in a DAO is a balancing act between providing autonomy and keeping it trustless. The yearn team seems to have found a good solution with increased autonomy of each team while not giving up control for YFI holders, which is a great outcome.
I could also see the Coop implementing something similar in the future.
yBrain = Methodologists
yDev = Dev team / Set
yPeople = Org / Compensation
yBudget = Treasury and so on
2 Likes
Thanks for creating this topic @verto0912
Just pulling out a few lines that caught my eye on a first read:
- ‘constrained delegation’ whereby YFI holders delegate their governance powers to autonomous groups like the Multisig and yTeams …
- Rather than being asked to make specific, operational decisions, YFI holders will conduct how power flows within yearn, wielding granular and clear control over every aspect of what yearn does.
- In contrast to core governance (which is top-down relative to users and bottom-up relative to creators) and DAO governance (which is top-down relative to creators and bottom-up relative to users), ‘constrained delegation’ avoids subordinating either group to the other.
- Behind every DAO implementation, there is a group of trusted contributors. Our model seeks to foreground these trusted relationships and give YFI holders the ability to modify them directly.
Planning to re-read again soon.
@verto0912 thanks for posting this thread and highlighting - this strikes a cord with me as well.
I see decentralization as a path with many steps along the way. Our DAO is well along the way towards true decentralization - in my mind one of the key markers along this path is community led enterprise level initiatives. The Metaverse Index was one of our first, and arguably most important up to this point.
I think the level of autonomy you lay out should be a target we shoot for over the next 6-9 months. I can easily see a situation this fall where we have 5-7 extremely strong and productive WG that operate with a high degree of autonomy.
1 Like
Interesting to have this resurfaced today and also to see how viewpoints may have changed - ‘Yearn is obviously much more complicated the the Coop’. I’d at least remove the ‘obviously’ from there now.
Gonna take this opportunity to drop in the link to another paper that is doing the rounds. KeeperDAOs beige paper. It contains the idea of the ‘Rule of non-opposition’. https://www.keeperdao.com/files/gov-beigepaper.pdf
2 Likes
that keeperdao paper is fascinating…just pulling out a few bits that seemed interesting at a glance
Crowd consensus: A member of the general public makes a proposal and posts it on a public forum. It is debated in public and can be modified and revised to adapt to public feedback.
Sophon consensus: Expert members of the DAO, called “Sophons”2 who have been designated as reviewers, analyze the proposal and publish a recommendation on whether to adopt, decline, or defer.
Tokenholder consensus: Following Sophon consensus, Tokenholders are offered the chance to object to the recommendation using a token-weighted vote that only counts “no”s, signaling the magnitude of their intent to exit, should the recommendation be upheld
When considering a proposal, those who would exit if the proposal were to pass, may signal that fact
using a token-weighted vote that only counts “no”s. The result is the number of tokens that would exit, allowing the group to measure the degree of consensus. In other words, we propose that the natural use for a token-weighted vote is to answer the question, “are there any objections?”.
3 Likes
another interesting one, seems like some governances are moving to a “yes, unless no” structure…
just biting from banteg,
3 Likes
I like the idea of reducing voter fatigue but it seems people still need to remain switched on in order to be able to block if needs. I see that will be nuances, like people communicating with each other about going to block etc. but if you are keeping an eye on the proposals, it is not much more effort to go vote FOR, is it?